Data isolation #
Overlay is multi-tenant. Every request is bound to a tenant on entry — either by hostname (a merchant's custom domain) or by session — and shop data is read and written through that tenant. Each tenant's data lives in a namespaced path: their catalog, waitlist, holds, marketing history, and design config are separate files in the tenant's own area. The exceptions are Overlay's own subscription-billing database, which is one shared database with a tenant_id column, and the inventory register database. Isolation between tenants is an explicit design rule with automated tests; some older code paths are still specific to the first shop (Off Premise) and are being removed. No independent test of the isolation has been done.
Unknown hostnames do not fall back to another tenant's storefront. New API endpoints are expected to resolve req.tenant; this is a code-review rule, backed by automated tests.
Encryption #
In transit
All traffic to overlaypos.com, tenant subdomains, and merchant custom domains is served over HTTPS through Render, and Overlay's server sends a Strict-Transport-Security header (max-age one year, including subdomains). The TLS version and the HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect are handled by Render; we have not independently verified them.
At rest
Application data is stored on a Render persistent disk. Overlay does not encrypt those files as a whole; individual secrets such as two-step sign-in secrets are stored encrypted, and the hourly backup copy is encrypted only when a backup encryption key is set. Whether Render encrypts the physical disk is Render's matter, which we have not verified. Platform secrets (for example Stripe keys and the session secret) are set as Render environment variables. Some shop credentials (for example Plaid bank tokens) are stored in that shop's data files; the backup does not upload files that hold secrets unless a backup encryption key is set. Merchant passwords are hashed with scrypt.
Access controls #
Overlay has three concentric layers of access:
- Session tokens — merchants and their staff sign in with email and password; sessions last 30 days in HTTP-only cookies, can be ended by signing out (which also ends the session on the server), and an optional two-step sign-in (authenticator app) is available. Password reset requires the current email on file.
- Per-tenant admin key — every tenant is issued a rotatable admin key that scopes API calls to that tenant. Admin keys never confer cross-tenant access.
- Master key — a single Overlay-operator secret guards super-admin endpoints (tenant provisioning, cross-tenant analytics, subprocessor management). It is held by the Overlay operator only and never issued to merchants.
Every /api/admin/* write requires either a valid session or the tenant's admin key. Unauthenticated write endpoints are refused at code review.
Deployment & code review #
Every push and pull request to the main branch runs the following checks in GitHub Actions:
npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high— the check fails on any HIGH or CRITICAL advisory.node --checkon every JavaScript file.- Unit, smoke and integration tests, and tests against a real Postgres database.
- ESLint: a change may not add lint errors (older findings do not block).
Every authentication change gets a separate adversarial review before release. Releases are deployed from main; there is no separate staging environment described here.
Every commit is expected to observe:
- No unbounded
express.json()handlers — every JSON body parser declares alimit. - No unauthenticated write endpoints under
/api/admin/*. - Shop data is read through the tenant on the request; automated tests (a tenant-separation test and a count of remaining first-shop-only code paths) check this.
Mass-send guardrails #
Marketing sends reach many customer addresses at once. The scripts Overlay's operator runs to send a campaign to more than one recipient call two checks before the campaign is created. These checks are in the operator scripts; they are not applied to a campaign a merchant sends from the dashboard.
- Preflight validation — subject-line length capped at 78 characters; every calendar date in the body is checked against its stated weekday; all links are HEAD-requested for resolution; template placeholders (
[First Name],[TBD],{{...}}) are refused; a preheader must be present. - Duplicate-send guard — a same-subject campaign created within the last 15 minutes is refused, preventing accidental double-sends when the same script fires twice.
Both checks accept an explicit --force override for the operator.
Monitoring & logging #
The server initializes Sentry at boot when SENTRY_DSN is set. A catch-all Express error middleware reports every 5xx with route, method, and tenant tags. Sensitive headers — authorization, cookie, x-admin-key, and square-access-token — are redacted before dispatch.
Server logs are kept at Render for the log retention of Render's plan, which Overlay has not confirmed. Overlay has not audited the logs for sensitive values.
Backups & retention #
Application state — catalog cache, waitlist, holds, marketing suppression, referrals, webhook ledger — is copied every hour to a private GitHub repository (only files that changed are uploaded). That repository keeps every version and nothing is deleted from it, and Overlay takes a restore point once a day. The copy is encrypted only when a backup encryption key is set. There is no 7-day rollover: data erased from the live system remains in earlier versions of the backup copy. The inventory register database is covered by a nightly encrypted backup that is written but not yet switched on. Render may also keep disk snapshots; Overlay does not control or promise them. When a merchant keeps its own POS, the source-of-truth records (Square catalog, Shopify products, WooCommerce inventory) live in that POS and Overlay treats its copy as a cache.
On account closure, Overlay deletes the files it keeps for the shop from its live system within 30 days, using a tool its operator runs by hand. That does not reach the backup copy, the databases, or copies held by third parties. Merchants can request an export at team@overlaypos.com; there is no self-serve whole-account export or deletion.
Incident response #
The operator on call is reachable at team@overlaypos.com. A reported vulnerability is acknowledged within 48 hours. Confirmed HIGH or CRITICAL findings are patched within 14 days; MODERATE within 30. Security researchers who ask for credit in a public advisory receive it.
If a customer data breach is confirmed, affected merchants are notified within 48 hours with the scope, root cause, and remediation. Public incident notes are posted below.
Subprocessors #
Overlay uses the following third-party services to deliver the product. Each merchant chooses the payment and POS provider they already use; the rest are Overlay-operator infrastructure.
| Provider | Purpose | Data | Region |
|---|---|---|---|
| Render | Application hosting, TLS termination | All application data at rest | US |
| AWS SES | Transactional and marketing email delivery | Recipient email, subject, HTML body, open/click events | US-East |
| Square | POS, catalog, inventory, hosted checkout (per-tenant) | Card data (Square only), order records, customer PII | US |
| Shopify | POS, catalog, checkout (per-tenant) | Card data (Shopify only), order records, customer PII | US/CA |
| Stripe | Overlay platform subscription billing | Merchant business name, email, payment metadata (no card numbers) | US |
| Anthropic | AI drafting and editing (emails, club plans, event pages, site edits, product descriptions), plain-English search, and reading supplier invoices, P&L files and bank transactions | Prompts, photos and PDFs a merchant or staff member provides, and the shop data each feature reads (for example catalog and sales summaries, supplier invoices, bank transactions) | US |
| Sentry | Server error reporting (opt-in per env) | Redacted request metadata, stack traces | US |
| EasyPost | Shipping labels (tenants that ship) | Recipient name and address, package weight | US |
| DoorDash Drive | Local delivery (tenants that deliver) | Recipient name, address, phone, order items | US |
| Twilio, Inc. | Text messages, for merchants who turn on SMS | Recipient phone number, message text | US |
| Lob Corporation | Printing and mailing checks, for merchants who pay distributors by check | Payee name and address, amount, memo | US |
| Plaid Inc. and Teller | Bank connection for a merchant's profit-and-loss view, for merchants who connect a bank | The merchant's bank transactions | US |
| HubSpot, Inc. | CRM sync, for merchants who connect it | Contact and order records | US |
| Slack Technologies, LLC | Business alerts, for merchants who connect it | Event summaries the merchant chooses | US |
| Xero Limited and Intuit Inc. (QuickBooks) | Accounting export, for merchants who connect one | Order and invoice totals | US / NZ |
| Google LLC | Analytics, Search Console and product feeds, for merchants who connect them | Site visit events, product data | US |
| GitHub, Inc. | Hourly backup copy of each shop's data files (private repository) | The data files Overlay keeps for each shop, including customer records. Encrypted only when a backup encryption key is set. Every version is kept | Not confirmed |
| Neon, Inc. | Postgres hosting for Overlay's subscription-billing records and the inventory register | Billing records (tenant id, plan, invoices, Stripe identifiers); register data | Not confirmed |
| Resend; Google (Gmail) | Marketing email delivery (Resend), transactional email (Gmail SMTP) and reading bounce notices (Gmail, read-only), where configured | Recipient email, subject, body; bounce notices | Not confirmed |
| Microsoft (Clarity) | Session recordings, only on the pages of a shop that sets a Clarity project id | Page interactions of that shop's visitors | Not confirmed |
| Meta Platforms; TikTok | Server-side conversion events, only for shops that set them up | Order value, hashed email and phone | Not confirmed |
| ipwho.is; ip-api.com | City and country lookup of a visitor's IP address, for Overlay's traffic monitor | Visitor IP address | Not confirmed |
| PagerDuty, Inc.; Discord | Operator alerts, only where configured | Alert title, message and context (such as a tenant id) | Not confirmed |
| Google LLC (Fonts) | Web fonts on overlaypos.com pages | Visitor IP address and browser details | Not confirmed |
Subprocessor changes that affect where merchant data is processed are communicated by email 30 days before they take effect.
Incident history #
Public incidents are recorded here with root cause and remediation.
/api/checkout pre-check trusted live Square inventory without deducting in-flight holds, and fell open on API timeouts. Fix: the pre-check now places tentative holds before the Square read and fails closed on timeout. Impact: one customer's order was fulfilled; two were refunded and apologized to.
Known limitations #
We list what we don't yet have, because a security page that only lists strengths isn't useful.
- No formal SOC 2 attestation. Overlay has no SOC 2 Type I or Type II report. Merchants who require one should not consider Overlay compliant until it is issued.
- No external penetration test on file. Overlay has not been audited by an independent security firm.
- Two-step sign-in is optional, not required. Dashboard users can turn on authenticator-app sign-in on their account security page; no role is required to use it yet. Without it, a password and a session cookie are the auth boundary.
- Single-process server. The application runs as a single Node process. Horizontal scale requires migrating hot JSON stores (waitlist, holds, referrals, webhook ledger) to a database with transactions. This is a scale limitation, not a data-integrity limitation for current volumes.
- No SOC 2 or ISO 27001 badges. We won't display certifications we don't have.
If you're evaluating Overlay for a business that requires any of the above, tell us — we'll be direct about timelines.
Security roadmap #
These are the security investments we've committed to, ordered by priority. Dates are targets, not guarantees.
- NextRequire two-step sign-in for admin roles. Authenticator-app sign-in is available now as opt-in; making it required for admin roles is not built.
- NextAdmin-key rotation UI. Self-serve rotate + revoke from the tenant dashboard.
- NextFix the remaining lint errors, then make lint a hard gate. Today a change may not add lint errors, but older ones remain.
- PlannedThird-party penetration test. Scope: authentication, checkout, tenant isolation, marketing send.
- PlannedDatabase migration for hot state. Move waitlist, holds, and webhook ledger from JSON to Postgres with transactions.
- PlannedFormal audit logs. Immutable append-only log of every admin write, exportable per tenant. Today some actions (for example role changes and module switches) are logged; not every admin write is.
- LaterSOC 2 Type I readiness. Requires the two items above first; not a near-term promise.
- LaterCustomer data-subject portal. Self-serve export and deletion for merchant customers, without needing to email support.
Report a vulnerability #
Email team@overlaypos.com. Do not open a public issue on any of our repositories. We acknowledge within 48 hours, patch HIGH/CRITICAL within 14 days, and MODERATE within 30. If you'd like credit in a public advisory, mention it in your report.
Something look wrong?
We would rather hear it from you first. Send it directly — one email, no bug bounty form.
team@overlaypos.com